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Funding for Defence
Peter Cozens1
The superior man, when resting in safety, does
not forget that danger may come. When in a state
of security he does not forget the possibility of
ruin. When all is orderly, he does not forget that
disorder may come. Thus his person is not
endangered, and his States and all their clans are
preserved.
Confucius
Chinese philosopher & reformer (551 BC - 479 BC)
Introduction
The Roman statesman Cicero once said that “endless
money forms the sinews of war”. It is perhaps just as
well that the New Zealand Defence Force is not
endowed with such largesse otherwise one might have
to contemplate a permanently fractious state of affairs.
Nonetheless, if the nation is to utilise a Defence Force
it is axiomatic that it is properly equipped, sustained,
managed and commanded for the various missions it is
intended to perform.
The catalyst for writing this article was the government’s
announcement of the Defence Sustainability Initiative
(DSI) in May 2005.  This entails a commitment to invest
some $4.6 billion of extra funding over a period of 10
years into the Defence budget. This article provides an
overview of the significant twists and turns of defence
policy over the past twenty years and supplies some
answers to the question of why the DSI became
necessary and what it is expected to achieve.
Differing policy approaches
In broad terms, there are three distinct periods of
differing attitudes to defence policy aligned with the
Lange, Bolger and Clark-led administrations:
a. The End of ANZUS (1985 - 1991);
b. A Peace Dividend (1991 - 1999); and
c. A Joint Force (1999 - 2005).
What follows is a short commentary on the first period,
a more detailed discussion concerning the effects of
reduced Defence budgets during the second period and
finally, a broad examination of significant policy
announcements and initiatives during the Clark-led
administration.
The end of ANZUS
Writing in a recent issue of the New Zealand
International Review, Dick Gentles (2005, p.7), a former
Deputy Secretary of Defence, states that the Labour
government under David Lange in the mid 1980s made
significant changes to New Zealand’s defence policy
before the end of the Cold War in 1989 to:
a. include anti-nuclear policies in New Zealand’s
defence posture;
b. assert an independent voice in security matters and
not to be inhibited by alliance arrangements; and
c. refocus defence on the South Pacific.
These measures were articulated in the 1987 Defence
White Paper. Gentles (225, p.8) suggests that there was
a suspicion by the Lange-led administration that the
New Zealand Defence Force had been shaped and
equipped to suit the requirements of allies rather than
to meet New Zealand’s place in the South Pacific.  It is
not the intention to comment on the politics of the
consequent fracturing of the ANZUS alliance. However,
in a practical sense, it resulted in a reduction of support
from the US in the form of intelligence cooperation,
operations with US forces and logistic support for the
New Zealand Defence Forces.
1 The author appreciates the assistance of Jim Olsen of the Ministry
of Defence with the preparation of the quantitative data.
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The senior leadership of Defence who had coped with
the demands of the Cold War were apparently hostile
to the ambitions of the new political direction. Deep
suspicions developed between the government and the
senior echelons of Defence. Caught in the middle as
these titans confronted one another in the change from
one military posture to another, the New Zealand
Defence Force suffered a detrimental loss of military
capability and effectiveness.
A peace dividend
The end of the Cold War in 1989 heralded for many
the potential for a welcome reduction in expenditures
for Defence - the so-called peace dividend.  This idea
seemed to pervade political thinking during the Lange
and Bolger administrations and appeared to be reflected
in reduced budgets (see Figure 1). A popular
misconception is the notion that a peace operation force
would cost less than a war-fighting or combat capable
force. It is probably true that equipment needs may differ
slightly for peacekeeping activities and would therefore
be in addition to those required for fully combat capable
activities. This places an extra burden on the budget.
Nevertheless, professional military advice is that peace
operations to be successful can only be performed by
properly prepared, well led, fully equipped,
comprehensively trained and combat capable armed
service professionals. These operations are usually
dangerous and complex missions – the recent
deployments to East Timor underscores this contention.
Contributions to peace operations by the New Zealand
Defence Force during the past 15 years or so include
East Timor, Bougainville, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan,
the Arabian Sea, Solomon Islands, Cambodia and
several others besides. The New Zealand armed services
have performed with distinction in all these missions
- for example, the Australian Commander of the East
Timor operation, General Peter Cosgrove, publicly
stated his approbations.  Nonetheless, it underscores
the line of reasoning that appropriate resources are
required to raise and sustain the armed services
whatever their missions may be.
To compound a generally declining fiscal situation for
Vote:Defence as a consequence of the Lange
administration’s policies, the incoming National
government in 1990 accepted that New Zealand did
not face a direct military threat and thus spending on
Defence could be reduced.  The Bolger administration
cut funding to Vote:Defence, according to Gentles
(2005), by some 18% in real terms and significant major
re-equipment plans were shelved during its first term.
In its third term of office, the administration produced
the 1997 Defence White Paper; this included a long-
term investment plan – but because of a subsequent
change in government it was not implemented.
The effect of reduced Defence
budgets
During the course of the final decade of the 20th century,
different political perceptions of the role of the New
Zealand Defence Force - caused in part by the end of the
Cold War, the fracturing of ANZUS, peacekeeping
operations and an estranged defence relationship with
the US – resulted in lower budgets and investment in
defence operations and infrastructure. Complicating this
situation was the ANZAC ship project, a scheme to re-
equip the Royal New Zealand Navy with new combat
capable ships at a cost of approximately $500 million
each. Two ships were ordered by the Lange-led
administration. This had damaging effects within Defence
where it promoted bitter and acrimonious competition
between the three armed services each of which wanted
to maintain or even extend its share of an ever-diminishing
pool of resources.
Compromising the previous duality of responsibility,
the Defence Act of 1990 divided Defence Headquarters
into the Ministry of Defence under the Secretary of
Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force under
the command of the Chief of Defence Force. The two
institutions were intended to provide contestable advice
to the Minister of Defence.  But a disagreeable outcome
of this arrangement was a “them and us” mentality that
impeded good management and the optimum allocation
of sparse resources to best effect.
Figure 1 illustrates the general downward trend of the
defence budget in the latter stages of the Lange-led
government to 1990, a further decline during the first
two terms of the Bolger administration and since the
low point of 1996/7 a period of recovery.
During the first term of the Bolger administration,
each of the three armed services, as part of a centrally
directed policy initiative, sought to move resources
“from the tail to the teeth” and to employ and reduce
any “fat” in the system in the interests of fiscal
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efficiency and effectiveness. Unfortunately,
uncooperative attitudes between the three services as
they each sought resources for their own projects
impeded and deferred important decisions of capital
procurements. Rather than promoting a more cohesive
and coherent military force, these policies and the
division of the Defence Headquarters into separate
entities tended to produce an “isolationist mentality”
within Defence itself and to inculcate a sense of severe
distrust with the ambitions of outside agencies, in
particular, the Treasury.  Not assisting the cause of
prudent and effective allocation of resources within
Defence were the apparently bewildering and rapid
changes occasioned by the economic reforms
introduced by Roger Douglas in the mid-to-late 1980s
and Ruth Richardson in the early 1990s.
In August 1999, Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and
Defence Select Committee, under the chairmanship of
Derek Quigley, produced a report entitled Inquiry into
Defence Beyond 2000.  It was extremely critical of the
Bolger government’s approach to the whole question of
Defence. In terms of fiscal impact, there were two
significant implications for the future:
a. a focus on operations in the South Pacific, and;
b. a reduction in war-fighting capacity in favour of
peace operations.
A joint force
The incoming centre-left administration led by
Helen Clark in 1999 accepted the broad thrust of
Derek Quigley’s report and in June 2000 the new
administration issued its Defence Policy Framework
based on that assessment. A précis of the five objectives
follows:
a. to defend New Zealand and to protect its people,
land, territorial waters, EEZ, natural resources and
critical infrastructure;
b. to meet our alliance commitments to Australia by
maintaining a close defence partnership in pursuit
of common security interests;
c. to assist in the maintenance of security in the South
Pacific and to provide assistance to our Pacific
neighbours;
d. to play an appropriate role in the maintenance of
security in the Asia-Pacific region, including meeting
our obligations as a member of the Five Power
Defence Arrangement; and
e. to contribute to global security and peacekeeping
through participation in the full range of UN and
other appropriate multilateral peace support and
humanitarian relief operations.
Figure 1. Defence Expenditure 1988/89 - 2005/06
Source: Ministry of Defence, Wellington.
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Nearly a year later the government announced its
intentions to re-shape the New Zealand Defence Force.
It appreciated that because of previously reduced
investments in Defence, resources were spread too thinly
across a range of capabilities, thus compromising overall
military effectiveness. Several reductions in force
structure followed, including the axing of the air combat
fighter force, but not necessarily as a consequence of
any specific public strategic review or White Paper
assessments. Nonetheless, the government stated that
the key components of the New Zealand Defence Force
would be:
a. a joint approach to structure and operational
orientation;
b. a modernised Army;
c. a practical Navy fleet matched to New Zealand’s
wider security needs,
d. a refocused and updated Air Force; and
e. a funding commitment to provide financial certainty.
This particular policy initiative of a “joint” approach
was intended to remove much of the previously
destructive tribalism and to enhance cooperation
between the three services. The recognition of “a funding
commitment to provide financial certainty” was a
significant appreciation of the previous handicap
affecting the complexities of defence organisation and
planning. These two firm policy directions provided
opportunities for a more coherent New Zealand
“profession of arms” as a consequence – cooperation
rather than competition has obvious merit.
The Long-Term Development Plan
In 2002 the government introduced its Long Term
Development Plan (LTDP) a planning tool to assist
decision-making in respect of defence policy
objectives but with a significant focus on major
weapon systems and capabilities. The new scheme
included provision for an injection of an extra $1
billion over 10 years.
The LTDP is a dynamic instrument that was updated
in June 2003 and again in November 2004 but with an
ability to accommodate other changes.  Such inbuilt
flexibility is a vital part of defence readiness and potency.
A significant feature of the LTDP is to enhance
confidence that new major capability projects will be
well managed and that acquisition schemes are
consistent with the government’s defence policy.
Procedures are therefore incorporated in the LTDP to
achieve capability development and implementation on
a robust and sustainable basis. The plan includes non-
financial descriptions of projects, their “Policy Value”,
“Capability Gaps”, “Links to other Capabilities”, plus
the all-important details of costs.  Irrespective of whether
there are disagreements over the actual acquisitions
under consideration from a strategic or security
perspective, the LTDP provides some certainty as
previously proposed in the government’s May 2001
Statement on Defence.
Some examples of the major re-equipment programme
for the armed services include the following plans.
Project Protector is a scheme to acquire one multi-role
vessel, two offshore and four inshore patrol vessels, to
be operated by the Royal New Zealand Navy. These
ships will conduct tasks for and with New Zealand
Customs, the Department of Conservation, the Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Fisheries, the Maritime
Safety Authority of New Zealand and the New Zealand
Police Force. This indicates an integrated whole-of-
government approach to security management in the
seas around New Zealand and beyond. The inshore
patrol vessels will operate around the New Zealand coast
throughout the year.  The offshore ships, capable of
operating naval helicopters, will conduct maritime
operations throughout New Zealand’s EEZ and the
Southern Ocean and also be used to assist Pacific Island
states to patrol their EEZs. The multi-role vessel will
provide a sealift facility for 250 troops, operate two naval
helicopters and have an ability to transfer cargo and
personnel ashore when port facilities are not available.
It can also be used for disaster relief especially in the
South Pacific islands after cyclones and other natural
catastrophes. The government endorsed a project budget
of $500 million.
The six P3K Orion aircraft of the Royal New Zealand
Air Force are to be provided with substantial upgrades.
This includes the replacement of the data management,
sensor, communications and navigation systems, and
the provision of associated ground systems - with a cost
of some $150-220 million for mission systems upgrade
and $60-100 million for the communications/
navigation systems upgrade.
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The five C130H Hercules aircraft operated by the Royal
New Zealand Air Force are to have a life extension
programme. This entails the replacement of specific
mechanical, avionic and structural components, and the
design and installation of flight deck communications
and navigation improvements to meet evolving air traffic
management regulations. The cost is estimated at $100-
170 million, plus a further $100-150 million for the
communications/navigation system upgrade.
The New Zealand Army acquired the first tranche of
188 Pinzgauer Light Operational Vehicles (LOVs) out
of a programmed total of 321 in October 2004 to replace
the ageing Landrovers. The cost is estimated at $60-
$110 million. This includes the vehicles, training,
publications, specialist test and tools equipment, spare
parts and project management costs.
These major re-equipment plans indicate a serious
commitment to ensuring that the New Zealand Defence
Force has the hardware to be able to perform the tasks
demanded by government policy.
The Review of Accountabilities
and Structural Arrangements
In addition to the LTDP the Clark-led administration
also sought to improve the performance of Defence
itself. This was an important measure to improve co-
operation not only between the three armed services
but also between civilian and military personnel within
and between both organisations. There had previously
been an unhelpful culture between the two institutions
that precluded cooperation between some military
officers and their civilian counterparts. The government
therefore commissioned the Review of Accountabilities
and Structural Arrangements (RASA), also known as the
Hunn Review, which was published in September 2002.
It aimed to improve not only the quality of strategic
advice but also to improve cooperation, consultation
and consensus building between the three services as
well as with and between civilian staff.  The review
criticised the division of Defence into the Ministry of
Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force as
occasioned by the Defence Act 1990 saying that “the
defence management system ... has not worked as well
in practice as was hoped when it was first designed”.
Recommended changes included a revision of the Act
itself to provide “shared responsibilities between the
Secretary of Defence and the Chief of Defence Force to
manage an integrated defence process”. That
recommendation has not been instituted. However, the
RASA has certainly had a significant effect elsewhere.
In 2004 the government introduced the Capability
Management Framework to replace the cumbersome
Defence Planning System as part of its ongoing
performance improvements. The new methodology was
designed to improve transparency of the governance and
management of long-term investments in Defence.  It
has also proved to be part of the foundation of what was
to become the Defence Sustainability Initiative in 2005.
The Defence Capability and
Resourcing Review
The events of 9/11 and other international turbulence
during the past seven or eight years have committed
the New Zealand Defence Force to operate at a much
higher tempo. This has had an effect on the resilience
and power of the armed services to maintain operational
effectiveness. One outcome of increased activity was the
exposure of significant deficiencies within the
infrastructure of Defence as a whole. The government
decided to investigate the problem and in December
2003 the Ministers of Defence, Finance and State
Services directed a multi-agency team to produce the
Defence Capability and Resourcing Review (DCARR).
In 2004 the DCARR team conducted an exhaustive
survey to establish the contemporary operating
environment of the New Zealand Defence Force and
its likely future requirements. The reviewers also
examined the ability of the Ministry of Defence to
provide policy advice. Arising from these studies the
review team produced a report identifying specific
shortfalls of capability, capacity and output issues but
also a 10-year plan to restore them to the levels required.
It may seem that 10 years is a long time in which to
achieve these ambitions - however, it must be appreciated
that the armed forces are comprised of people many of
whom require lengthy and sophisticated training plus
experience to be militarily proficient.
The review team identified a significant decline in total
staff numbers, comprised of both military and civil
personnel, from 20,785 in June 1991 to 12,889 in June
2004, an overall loss of about 40%. Although other parts
of the economy may benefit from the acquisition of
well-trained and capable personnel, the effect on the
New Zealand Defence Force has been to place extra
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strain on recruitment and training, thus detracting from
operational potency.  Figure 2 illustrates the downward
trend of personnel numbers in Defence between 1990
and 2005.
at the expense of others often characterised the
relationship resulting in less than optimal outcomes.  It
is not known who decided to insert the State Services
Commission into the process of the DCARR, but this
Another latent but equally negative effect on the mission
capability of the New Zealand Defence Force arising
from the increased tempo of operations was the effect
on families of service personnel. Personnel returning
from an extensive deployment overseas were sometimes
required to re-engage in the same or another theatre of
operations after only a short period of recuperation at
home.  The consequent stress on families often resulted
in well trained, experienced and competent personnel
making a choice to terminate their military careers.  One
means of correcting this problem is to increase the
number of personnel under arms and to rotate them
through a more measured series of operations, retraining
and upskilling.
In the past, relations between the Treasury and Defence
were not always constructive.  Obfuscation, second-
guessing, personal meddling and single service agendas
piece of ingenuity, together with the new joint approach,
appears to have had a beneficial effect by helping the
two traditional protagonists to be more focussed on
producing optimal outcomes. The review team
concluded that as a result of many years of under-
investment, and notwithstanding the intentions of the
LTDP, the capacity and capability of the New Zealand
Defence Force and the Ministry of Defence in some
very important areas were below the requirements of
government policy. It was noted, for instance, that:
a. personnel numbers in the New Zealand Defence
Force are below required levels;
b. in some trades the number of personnel and their
trained state is deficient;
c. some major weapons platforms require upgrading
or replacement;
Figure 2. NZDF Personnel Numbers as at 1 July
Source: Ministry of Defence, Wellington.
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d. some military equipment no longer meets the
required standard;
e. contingency reserve stocks of ammunition, fuel and
spares are depleted;
f. there is a backlog of maintenance and capital
expenditure in Defence real estate; and
g. aspects of corporate management capability are
depleted.
The review team acknowledged various reasons for the
loss of capability, and including:
a. a prolonged period of fiscal restraint in the 1990s;
b. a higher tempo of operations since 1998;
c. equipment continuing in service beyond its
economic life;
d. a strong labour market affecting the ability to recruit
and retain key personnel;  and
e. a reduction in the Headquarters of the New Zealand
Defence Force of support capabilities due to the high
and pro-longed operational tempo.
The DCARR thus identified and quantified practical
problems confronting the New Zealand Defence Force
and the Ministry of Defence. The developing of
appropriate expertise, experience and other desirable
changes will take time in an organisation that is already
actively engaged and employed in complex operations
overseas. The armed services are inherently conservative
and traditional - it is part of the military ethos. Change,
if not properly explained and executed, runs the risk of
producing unwelcome outcomes.
The Defence Sustainability
Initiative
In May 2005, the government announced the Defence
Sustainability Initiative (DSI). The purpose of this plan is
to not only rebuild the New Zealand Defence Force to be
able to produce the military outputs deemed necessary by
the government’s defence policy settings but also to improve
corporate management within the Defence Headquarters
itself. It gives material substance to the findings of the
DCARR published a few months previously. The DSI is
thus the latest measure in a long string of policy
formulations to improve in all respects the contribution
made by Defence to the government’s policy objectives.
The most important part of the announcement
concerned the investment of an extra $4.6 billion in
defence spending over a period of 10 years. This
includes:
a. an increase of operating funding of $4.438 billion
(GST exclusive) for the New Zealand Defence Force
over ten years from 2005/6;
b. capital injections of up to $209 million over the
period FY 2007/08 to FY 2009/10 (or later if the
LTDP allowance is not exhausted by then) with a
review of the appropriateness of this amount at the
mid-term;
c. a permanent baseline increase of $0.844 million
(GST exclusive) from 2005/6 for the Ministry of
Defence;
d. the Crown bearing the risk associated with the
impact on depreciation of asset revaluations for the
first five years of the DSI, reviewable at the mid-
term review of the DSI; and
e. a multi-year arrangement that allows for flexibility
in the funding of operational deployments.
The DSI in many respects reiterates previous policy
statements but in this case actually commits the Crown
to provide the wherewithal. In other words, it provides
funding certainty, a weakness identified several years ago
in the government’s Defence Statement of May 2001.
Some proposals included in the plan underscore this
contention, including:
a. strengthening the organisational and corporate
capability of the Headquarters of the New Zealand
Defence Force, and indeed the Ministry of Defence
as well;
b. a new recruiting drive to lift personnel numbers;
c. the development of a New Zealand Defence Force
real estate strategy; and
d. a programme to build up infrastructure including
new IT capabilities.
The financial picture of the plan depicted in Figure 3
reveals a gradually increasing level of expenditure from
2005/06 for the next 10 years.  This suggests a measured
increase as more personnel are recruited, trained and
reach the required levels of competence.
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As part of the whole series of policy developments
initiated by the Clark-led administration, future plans
will include a new Strategic Plan and the expansion of
the Defence Corporate Planning Framework to guide
strategic management and to coordinate subordinate
plans to integrate the management of personnel,
infrastructure, equipment and resources.
An alternative approach
A significant expression of an alternative approach to
Defence policy was published by the Royal New Zealand
Returned Services Association in April 2005. It is a
comprehensive survey and merits close study. Of
particular importance the document states:
The development of defence policy in New
Zealand has been an unnecessarily opaque
process.  Successive governments have failed to
consult citizens adequately.  Major reviews have
been far too infrequent – the most recent White
Paper was done in 1997, well before the events
of September 11, 2001 changed our world.
(RNZRSA 2005, p. ii)
This political criticism is not without validity. Getting
the nation’s defence strategy right is of critical importance
within a broader schema to ensure collective security. A
significant weakness in the Clark-led administration with
respect to New Zealand’s defence policy is that there has
not been a Defence White Paper or major public review
of defence during the past six years within an overarching
review of national security. Nonetheless, the Minister of
Defence (Burton, 2005, p.6), in an address to the
International Institute of Strategic Studies at the Shangri
La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2005, sought to dispel
criticism of this omission and instead to suggest that there
were differing policy-making approaches that worked just
as well. He emphasised that the approach taken by the
government was “carefully calibrated, publicised and
debated in our open society, and circulated to our allies
and friends”.  A differing approach is taken in Australia
where the Defence White Paper 2000 addressed strategic
policy which then guides defence policy. Following the
events of 9/11 another review – Australia’s National
Security: A Defence Update 2003 – was released in February
2003. In the United Kingdom, The 1998 Strategic Defence
Review was followed by the Defence White Paper in
December 2003.  Given the rapidly changing strategic
environment, it is important that defence policy is
continually reviewed.  The White Paper process provides
a suitable vehicle.
Figure 3. Defence Operating Funding – Budget 2005
Source: DSI (2005).
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Conclusion
The policy initiatives in Defence during the past six
years offer substance, clarity of purpose and certainty.
After substantial reductions in expenditure (in real
terms) by previous administrations, plans and political
commitment are now in place to rebuild the New
Zealand Defence Force to provide an ability to meet
future policy objectives. The various newly introduced
corporate management and planning tools provide a
robust foundation on which successive administrations
will be able to build and alter capabilities as changing
circumstances dictate. The adage by Confucius quoted
at the beginning of this article remains germane.
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